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A B S T R A C T
Should schools increase teachers’ salaries to improve pupil attainment? We study the potential implications of an
individual school offering higher teacher salaries from within a fixed budget by exploiting a natural experiment
that forces some schools within a local area to pay teachers according to higher salary scales, but does not offer
any extra funding. We show schools follow this regulation and pay their teachers more. The characteristics of
teachers are largely unaffected, but teachers at high pay schools are less likely to be absent. Teacher and assistant
numbers are largely unchanged. Instead, schools balance their budgets by making sizeable reductions in other
expenditures, particularly spending on equipment and services, amounting to around 4% of non-instructional
spending. There is no evidence of any overall effect on pupil attainment, however. It is likely that positive effect
of the natural experiment through teachers is almost exactly countered by the negative effects of reductions in
other expenditure.
1. Introduction
Schools across developed countries are gaining more autonomy over
budget decisions and teacher salaries, meaning it is increasingly im-
portant to identify the effect of school spending choices on pupil at-
tainment. In England, recent reforms have given state-funded schools
more autonomy over the level and structure of teacher pay. In the US,
charter schools have more freedom to set teacher pay outside regula-
tions imposed on public schools, whilst the Race to the Top initiative
encouraged states and school districts to decentralise more budgetary
decisions to public school principals. Previous research has studied the
effect of increasing the overall level of resources, with most recent work
finding positive effects of higher resources (Jackson, Johnson, and
Persico (2015), Gibbons, McNally, and Viarengo (2018),
Hyman (2017), Lafortune, Rothstein, and Schanzenbach (2018),
Jackson, Wigger, and Xiong (2018), Baker (2019). Other evidence
suggests offering higher teacher salaries across large geographic areas
may improve pupil attainment (Loeb and Page (2000), Gilpin (2012),
Leigh (2012), Hendricks (2014), Britton and Propper (2016) and
Tran (2017)). However, there is no existing evidence of the effects of an
individual school offering higher salaries and the underlying mechan-
isms through which this may affect pupil attainment.
In this paper, we study a natural experiment that effectively forces
some schools within a local area to pay teachers according to higher
salary scales, holding school budgets constant.This allows us to produce
convincing estimates of the effects of raising salaries at individual
schools, and the underlying mechanisms driving the reduced form ef-
fects: teacher sorting and efficiency wage concerns, countered by re-
ductions in other expenditure.
In contrast, existing estimates of the effects of teacher salaries
(Loeb and Page (2000), Gilpin (2012), Leigh (2012), Hendricks (2014),
Britton and Propper (2016) and Tran (2017)) typically consider the
impact of raising teacher salaries with a commensurate increase in
funding, which is not necessarily relevant for individual schools.
Through studying the effects of differences in teacher and outside
wages over wide geographical areas, the underlying mechanisms in
these studies include teacher occupational choices (in addition to the
sorting of teachers across areas/schools and efficiency wages) which is
largely irrelevant for individual schools when considering whether to
raise teacher pay.
The natural experiment we exploit is a sharp geographical dis-
continuity in teacher salary scales in England. During our period of
study, teachers in England were paid according to centrally determined
salary scales. These increase with experience, but are also higher in the
London area to compensate for a higher cost of living. There are four
pay zones: inner London, outer London, fringe London and the rest of
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England. In the case of inner and outer London, higher teacher salaries
come with higher levels of funding, and the boundaries of the pay zone
coincide with other administrative geography that are likely to affect
pupil attainment (boundaries of school districts and zoning for housing
development). We instead focus on the boundary between fringe
London and the rest of England. For a given level of experience, teacher
salary scales are about £1,000, or about 5%, higher in fringe London as
compared with the rest of England. This boundary often runs within
school districts (or local authorities as they are called in England),
meaning that education policy is relatively constant for schools in close
proximity and either side of the boundary. Teachers are free to live
either side of the boundary, the cost of living is likely to be constant
within a small distance to the boundary and schools and communities
are likely to be similar either of the boundary (which we confirm).
Conditions and other benefits are also constant across the boundary
given nationally governed pay and conditions. We therefore interpret
the boundary as representing an exogenous increase in the salary that
must be paid to a teacher of a given level of experience. We show that
schools inside the fringe London boundary don’t receive proportio-
nately higher funding to account for the regulated higher teacher salary
scales. Schools must therefore pay the higher teacher salaries from
within their fixed budget, which allows us to study the resource choices
made by schools. Anomalies in funding differences across areas have
already been studied in England to show that increases in funding
(without increases in teacher salaries) can improve pupil attainment
(Gibbons et al. (2018)).
We confirm that teacher pay follows the regulation and that schools
in the “high pay” area spend a greater share of their budgets on teacher
salaries as a result, with offsetting reductions in non-staff expenditures
to balance the budget. There is little evidence that this leads to ob-
servable differences in the sorts of teachers at individual schools, al-
though we have imperfect measures of teacher quality. We do find in-
direct evidence to support an efficiency wage mechanism, however,
with teachers on the high pay side of the boundary less likely to be
absent or sick. This is a valuable finding as there is little existing evi-
dence of efficiency wage effects for teachers. Finally, there is little
evidence of any net positive effect on pupil attainment from the com-
bination of higher teacher salaries and reduced non-teacher spending.
Due to the relative precision of our estimates, in our preferred specifi-
cation we are able to rule out quantitatively small positive estimates of
0.046 and 0.036 standard deviations in English and maths at age 11,
respectively.
This combination of results suggest that schools optimally adjust
resources so that the combined effect of higher regulated teacher salary
scales and consequent changes in other expenditure has few implica-
tions for student achievement. Given that the pay regulation has been in
place since the 1970s, our estimates of a near zero policy effect re-
present a long-run equilibrium.
The near zero total policy effects could be because the positive ef-
fects of higher salaries and negative effects of reduced non-teacher
expenditures are both small. However, it could also be that larger ef-
fects offset each other. We argue that the latter is a more plausible
explanation. The recent literature on school resources shows significant
effects of changes in school expenditures (Jackson (2018)), including
negative effects of reductions in school resources overall
(Jackson et al. (2018)). There is also a well-established literature
showing that teacher sorting is sensitive to financial incentives
(Clotfelter, Glennie, Ladd, and Vigdor (2008) and Steele, Murnane, and
Willett (2010)). Cabrera and Webbink (2019) argue that such in-
centives only improve pupil achievement if they lead to changes in
teacher characteristics linked to pupil attainment, such as teacher ex-
perience. Whilst we dont find any evidence of changes in teacher ex-
perience, we do find evidence of reduced teacher absence as a result of
higher salaries, which is linked to higher student achievement
(Herrmann & Rockoff (2012)).
Our results imply that the net benefits of a school offering higher
teacher salaries from within a fixed budget are likely to be minimal.
This is relevant to both regulated and autonomous schools in England,
as both school types have similar freedoms on non-teacher ex-
penditures, and, since 2013, almost complete autonomy over teacher
pay and progression. Our results also imply that existing school re-
source decisions are relatively efficient as schools are able to adjust
other resources in ways that lead to little overall change in pupil at-
tainment.
These results are mainly relevant for schools with autonomy over
teacher pay and the setting of non-instructional resources. However,
our exploration of the size of the underlying mechanisms increases the
relevance to all school systems, e.g. how teacher salaries can affect
teacher absence and the likely negative effects of cuts to non-instruc-
tional spending. The main limitation is that the higher teacher salaries
and cuts to non-instructional spending could affect wider outcomes we
are not able to observe, such as other aspects of teacher characteristics
or pupils’ mental health.
This paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 motivates our empirical
approach by presenting a brief model of how student achievement re-
lates to teacher wages and school resources. Section 3 summarises the
key institutional details relating to schools and teachers in England.
Section 4 describes our empirical strategy and data sources. Section 5
presents our empirical results. Section 6 concludes.
2. Teacher wages, school resources and student achievement
This section presents a model of student achievement in relation to
teacher salaries and school resource decisions. This motivates our focus
on the effect of changing teacher wages at individual schools within a
fixed budget and how this differs from the current literature on the
effects of teacher wages. We also detail the mechanisms through which
this resource allocation affects student achievement.
Consider the level of student achievement at an individual school
within a large geographic area such as a state or city-region. Schools are
indexed by s and there are many schools within the area. Taking a
standard school production function approach (Hanushek (2006);
Todd and Wolpin (2003)), as shown in Eq. (1), we assume average
student achievement (Ys) at school s is a function of the characteristics
of pupils at the school (XsP), the pupil:teacher ratio at the school (QST),
the quantity of other resources per pupil (QSO) and the average quality of
teachers at the school (T¯s). We also assume that schools are provided
with a fixed level of funding per pupil from government (Bs). Schools
maximise Ys subject to a budget constraint, such that spending on
teachers and spending on other goods is less than Bs (Eq. (2)).
Average teacher quality (T¯s) is assumed to be a function of teacher
wages at the school (WsT), the average wage at other schools in the area
(W sT ), the outside wage for teachers (WO) and pupil characteristics
(XsP) (equation 3).=max Y f X Q Q T s t( , , ¯ ) . .s sP sT SO s (1)
= +B Q W Q Ps sT sT SO O (2)
=T g W W W X¯ ( , , , ).s sT sT O SP (3)
X P B W W given, , , ,sP O s sT O
We assume schools are able to set their own teacher wage rate,
reflecting evidence that suggests they possess significant monopsonistic
power over wages (Ransom & Sims (2010)) and the increasing au-
tonomy over teacher salaries possessed by schools in England, the US
and other countries. We assume that they are price takers for other
inputs and that non-wage benefits (such as conditions of employment)
are taken as fixed due to regulation.1 Budgets are assumed to be
1 In England, this will reflect national conditions of service. In the US, con-
ditions of service are generally constant within school districts, which (Loeb &
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provided by government and taken as fixed by schools when making
resource decisions.
This model incorporates a number of potential mechanisms by
which changes in relative teacher wages can affect teacher quality and
thereby student achievement. First, as per a standard Roy model
(Roy (1951)), changes in relative teacher wages will affect the average
quality of individuals who chose to become teachers through their oc-
cupational choices.2 Second, relative teacher wages could affect teacher
effort levels through efficiency wage concerns (Shapiro &
Stiglitz (1984)). Third, the level of teacher wages at individual schools
will affect the sorting of teachers between schools. Schools choosing
higher teacher salaries are likely to attract more applicants. As long as
schools can observe potential teacher quality and high quality teacher
prefer higher pay levels, this should allow higher pay schools to employ
higher quality teachers.
To date, the literature has mainly focused on how teacher wages
affect student achievement through the first two mechanisms (occu-
pational choices and efficiency wages). Gilpin (2012), Leigh (2012),
Loeb and Page (2000), Britton and Propper (2016) and Tran (2017)
focus on differences in teacher wages across large geographical areas
and are thus likely to exclude teacher sorting. Hendricks (2014) focuses
exclusively on the occupational choices mechanism.
de Ree, Muralidharan, Pradhan, and Rogers (2018) isolate the effect of
higher teacher salaries on pupil attainment for existing teachers, and so
through efficiency wages only. In contrast, the effect of an individual
school changing teacher pay will reflect a combination of the second
two mechanisms (efficiency wages and sorting across schools), as
changes in teacher pay at one school are unlikely to affect occupational
choices.
Our interest lies in the marginal policy effect of changes in teacher
wages at individual schools on overall student achievement, holding the
budget fixed, which has not been estimated in the literature to date.
This overall effect will incorporate a combination of different me-
chanisms, potentially working in opposite directions. Pupil attainment
could be boosted by increases in teacher quality T( ¯ )s driven by a com-
bination of efficiency wage and sorting effects. Clotfelter et al. (2008)
and Steele et al. (2010) find that teacher sorting responds to financial
incentives, for example, although some evidence suggests that the
sorting of teachers to schools is more sensitive to school and pupil
characteristics than wages (Hanushek, Kain, and Rivkin (2004);
Bonesronning, Falch, and Strom (2005)). There is no existing evidence
on the direct implications of teacher sorting for student achievement.
The overall effect will also include potential negative effects of reduced
spending on other resources Q( ),SO given that the budget must balance.
The new literature on school resources suggests that such negative ef-
fects could be important (Jackson et al. (2015); Jackson (2018)). The
existing work on teacher pay assumes, either explicitly or implicitly,
that school budgets co-vary with changes in teacher pay (e.g. Loeb and
Page (2000) state that pay higher salaries are also likely to provide
higher levels of school funding). Also underlying our effect is any at-
tempt by other schools or policymakers to respond to pay differences
across schools, through pay or non-pay factors. We argue below that
such effects are small in practice.
The main implication from this analysis is whether shifting school
budgets towards higher teacher salaries can improve pupil attainment,
i.e. whether the efficiency wage and sorting effects outweigh the ne-
gative resource effects. If there are large net positive or negative effects,
this would imply schools are currently behaving inefficiently, as a
simple shift in resources can improve pupil attainment. A near zero
effect would imply schools are allocating current resources in an effi-
cient manner. Furthermore, how other resources adjust to fund higher
teacher salaries could in principle reveal new evidence on schools’ re-
source preferences.
Consideration of this model therefore highlights that changes in
teacher wages can operate through three primary channels: occupa-
tional choices; efficiency wage concerns; sorting of teachers across
schools, with the first unlikely to be relevant in our setting. The model
also indicates that the offer of higher teacher wages by schools is likely
to be an endogenous response to their situation. To identify the impact
of higher teacher wages on student achievement one therefore cannot
simply compare student achievement at schools offering different levels
of teacher wages. Ideally, one would use a randomised experiment that
forced some schools to offer higher teacher salaries, holding budgets
fixed. In the next section, we describe a natural experiment in England
that comes close to replicating such a scenario.
3. Institutional background
Our empirical strategy makes use of sharp geographical dis-
continuities in teacher pay levels in England. In this section, we de-
scribe how schooling and the teacher labour market operate in England,
concluding with the implications for our empirical strategy.
3.1. Schools and teachers in England
The majority of pupils in England attend primary schools from ages
4–11 before attending secondary school after age 11 through to age 16.
We focus on primary schools rather than secondary schools as they are
more numerous, which increases the precision of our results. All pupils
in state-funded schools in England must sit external assessments at the
end of primary school in Maths and English, known as Key Stage 2
(KS2) tests. These are our main measures of student achievement.3
There are two main types of school in England: maintained schools
and Academies. The main differences are that Academies have more
freedoms over school organisation, can deviate from the national cur-
riculum and, before 2013, had more freedoms over teacher pay.
Academies are very similar to US charter schools. However, it is only
since September 2010 that primary schools could apply to become
Academies. Over the period covered by our data (2006 to 2011), most
state-funded primary schools were maintained schools and were the
responsibility of the 151 Local Education Authorities (LEAs) across
England.
LEAs are similar to US school districts. They are responsible for
providing budgets to individual schools, coordinating admissions, as-
sisting with the governance of the school and providing some central
services for all schools in their area (e.g. support for children with
special educational needs). Although LEAs are responsible for funding
schools, this money is not raised through local taxation. It primarily
comes from a grant from central government (called the Dedicated
Schools Grant).4 This grant is supposed to reflect the differences in the
needs and costs of providing schooling in different areas. Indeed, there
is an “Area Cost Adjustment” to account for differences in costs, though
prior work has suggested this has not always been perfectly aligned
with actual differences in costs (Gibbons et al. (2018)). LEAs are then
responsible for how to distribute this grant to different schools in their
area. Each sets its own school funding formula, with the most important
factors being pupil numbers and the socio-economic mix of pupils at the
school (Sibieta (2015)).
Individual schools are responsible for resource decisions, given the
(footnote continued)
Page, 2000) difference out through school district fixed effects.
2 As discussed below, this mechanism is not relevant for our study, but we
include it to compare our setting to the previous literature on the impact of
teacher salaries on pupil attainment.
3 Pupils in private or independent schools do not have to sit these tests, but
account for only about 6% of each cohort of pupils.
4 LEAs are able to add to this grant if they wish, but very few do in practice
(Sibieta (2015))
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fixed budget from the LEA. In particular, it is individual schools who
make hiring decisions for teachers and other staff and how much to
spend on different types of resources, subject to regulations. For ex-
ample, there are maximum class sizes for under 7s and there exists
national pay and conditions for teachers, which are reflected in the
School Teachers’ Pay and Conditions Document (STPCD). All schools
(maintained schools and Academies) have considerable freedom as to
how they employ other members of staff (e.g. teaching assistants and
administrative staff), who can be employed on temporary or fixed
contracts. All schools also have freedom on spending on non-staff re-
sources, such as books, services and energy.
3.2. Teacher pay
During the period we study, teachers in England were paid ac-
cording to a national salary scale that had nine different points (M1-6,
U1-3). In principle, schools had some discretion about how quickly
their teachers move up the pay scale. In practice, position on the pay
scale was almost entirely determined by years of experience. Schools
could choose to use some additional payments to pay teachers above
the salary scales if they wished,5 but these flexibilities were rarely used
by schools.
Since September 2010, many primary schools have converted to
Academy status and thus gained additional freedom over teacher pay,
though few will have had any opportunity to use these freedoms before
our final outcomes are measured in May 2011. From September 2013,
all state-funded schools in England were given more autonomy over
teacher pay, with pay scales replaced by minimum and maximum levels
and all schools are required to have their own individual pay policies.
Our research describes the likely implications of a school choosing to
use these freedoms to offer higher salary levels, which is now a relevant
choice for all schools in England.
In order to reflect the higher cost of living in or near London, the
level of the pay scales varies across the London area. Specifically, there
are four different pay zones: inner London (highest pay zone); outer
London; the fringe area of London; and, the rest of England and Wales
(lowest pay zone). These are shown in Appendix Fig. A.1, excluding the
rest of England and Wales. The boundary of the inner London and outer
London pay boundary both coincide with the boundaries between LEAs.
The outer London boundary also coincides with the boundary of the
“green belt” (which severely reduces housing development on the low-
pay side of the border). As a result, the inner and outer London
boundary could be correlated with differences in schools policy and
family background. By contrast, the fringe boundary (shown in Fig. 1)
mostly runs within LEAs, along local authority district boundaries (e.g.
within Kent or Buckinghamshire). Local authority districts are smaller
local administrative units that are responsible for a number of non-
education functions., e.g. waste collection. As a result, there is no
reason to expect education policy or pupil characteristics to differ either
side of the fringe boundary (which we confirm empirically).
The boundaries of the pay zones and the system of London allow-
ances were introduced in 1974 following the recommendations of the
Pay Board and Houghton Committee reports of the same year (Zabalza
& Williams (1979)). The fringe zone was established in order to prevent
a large step change in teacher salaries at the outer London boundary.
The fringe boundary has not changed since it was first established and
has largely remained as a fixed amount on top of the pay scales for the
rest of England and Wales. Given that the fringe pay zone has existed
for more than 30 years, our results represents the long-term equili-
brium.
Our empirical strategy relies on the differences in pay scales across
the fringe boundary. Fig. 2 shows the level of each point of the seven
points in the pay scale either side of the fringe boundary over the period
covered by our data (2006 to 2011). The differences across the
boundary correspond to about £1,000 right across the pay scale
throughout the period, or about 3–5% of teacher salary levels in the rest
of England. These differences are within the range of increases in tea-
cher salaries that individual schools could decide to award from within
their fixed budgets, and so are policy relevant. It is unlikely that schools
would be able to unilaterally offer substantially higher salaries.
3.3. Implications for school resource decisions and student achievement
We interpret the pay boundary as representing a difference in the
minimum salary levels that must be paid to teachers with a given level
of experience. We analyse the net implications of this rule for student
achievement and detail the mechanisms driving this effect, including:
actual teacher pay levels; school expenditure decisions; teacher sorting;
and, teacher absences.
As argued in Section 2, the implications for school resource deci-
sions and student achievement will depend on differences in school
budgets at the boundary. Given that we find no difference in school
budgets at the boundary, schools on the high pay side effectively face a
higher price of employing teachers with no compensating change in
their income. It therefore forms an ideal natural experiment to study the
implications of increases in teacher pay from within fixed budgets.
The fact that there is no difference in funding per pupil at the fringe
boundary is somewhat surprising. At the inner and outer London
boundaries, schools do receive higher levels of funding (13–14%) to
compensate for higher teacher salaries. It is not entirely clear why there
is no evidence of any compensation for schools at the fringe boundary.
It may be that because the differences in salaries are relatively small,
local authorities felt they could be absorbed by schools. This is no
longer the case, as new simpler local authority funding formulae were
introduced in 2013, which explicitly recognise the fringe boundary.
This, and the introduction of greater freedoms on teacher pay are the
main reasons we do not extend our analysis beyond 2011.
Absent any restrictions on teacher numbers, the combination of
higher teacher pay and unchanged budgets should lead to re-enforcing
substitution and income effects that reduce teacher numbers (assuming
teacher expenditure is a normal good). Regulation on teacher numbers
(such as maximum class sizes for pupils aged 5–7) seems likely to limit
any reduction in spending on teachers, however, and may even lead to
an increase in spending if the restrictions are strong enough and the
income and substitution effects are weak. Teachers are also a discrete
good and schools might not be willing to reduce teachers numbers in
response to a 5% increase in teacher salaries. However, there are ways
that schools could reduce expenditure on teachers, e.g. limiting addi-
tional payments, hiring teachers with different experience or slowing
teachers’ progress through the salary scales. Schools on the low-pay side
of the boundary could further smooth the actual difference in teacher
pay across the boundary by paying their teachers more. We test for such
effects by examining the actual differences in teacher pay across the
boundary, the level of additional payments and average position on the
salary scale.
In principle, schools could consider adjusting wider conditions and
non-pecuniary rewards to respond to the pay regulations. However, this
is unlikely to be feasible in practice, given statutory national pay and
conditions. Any changes to conditions of service could also be im-
plemented by schools on both side of the boundary.
We therefore interpret the net impact on pupil attainment as the
effect of higher teacher salaries and offsetting reductions in other ex-
penditure, exploring these mechanisms in as much detail as possible
given the available data.5 Additional payments include recruitment and retention payments, teaching
and learning responsibility payments and payments for teachers working with
children with special educational needs.
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4. Data and empirical methods
Our identification strategy relies on a sharp geographical dis-
continuity in teacher pay scales. In particular, we compare resource
choices, teacher characteristics and student achievement at schools ei-
ther side and within close proximity of the fringe London teacher pay
zone boundary. We therefore require schools to be well balanced in
areas in close proximity to the boundary. This section outlines our
identification strategy, data sources and summary statistics that suggest
our identification assumption is credible.
4.1. Empirical strategy
For ease of exposition, let us assume that the production function in
equation 1 is additive and separable. Taking the difference in mean
pupil attainment across schools in the high (H) and low-pay (L) regions
gives:
= + + ++Y Y X X Q Q Q Q T T( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )H L p H
P
L
P
Q H
T
L
T
O H
O
L
O
T H L
H L (4)
where XP denotes observable pupil characteristics, QT denotes the pu-
pil:teacher ratio, QO denotes the ratio of other inputs to pupil numbers,
T denotes average teacher quaity, ε denotes unobservable pupil
characteristics and where and x denotes the mean of x across schools.
By comparing schools in very close proximity to the boundary, we
expect there to be very small differences in observable pupil char-
acteristics X X( )HP LP and unobservable characteristics ( )H L . We
test this assumption by examining the differences in a range of pupil
characteristics at schools either side of the boundary, which suggests
very few (if any) differences.
Our preferred specification estimates the difference in student
achievement and resource choices using schools within 2 km of the
boundary. We account for pupil and school characteristics using Fully-
Interacted Linear Matching (FILM) (Blundell, Dearden, &
Sianesi (2005)). FILM differs from standard OLS regression in that FILM
linearly interacts the treatment effect with all pupil and school char-
acteristics. This then provides an impact estimate for all schools in the
sample given their characteristics, which we average across all schools
in the high pay region to correspond to the average treatment effect on
the treated (ATT). The main advantage of FILM compared to OLS is that
it is more flexible in allowing the treatment effect to vary with school
characteristics. In our case, the FILM estimates are also generally more
precise than both OLS and propensity score matching.
We test the robustness of our results by comparing schools within
various distances to the boundary (1, 2 or 3km) and using various
methods to control for observable characteristics (raw differences, OLS
Fig. 1. Fringe Londonpay boundary, notes and source: school teacher pay and conditions document; solid lack lines represent LEA boundaries.
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and kernel matching). We also use local linear regression methods often
used in regression discontinuity design (Lee & Lemieux (2010)) to
confirm that student achievement is similar across the boundary no
matter what distance we use. Data is pooled across years, but the point
estimates are very similar when we estimate separately by year.
4.2. Data
We link together data from a number of administrative data sets
over various years. In particular, we use data from the National Pupil
Database from 2006 to 2011, which contains the test results and ob-
servable characteristics for every pupil in state-funded schools in
England. Our main outcomes are the school-level average points scores
in Key Stage 2 Maths and English, standardised at the national level.6
We disregard data for 2010 as a large number of schools boycotted Key
Stage 2 national examinations in that year. Our sample consists of
schools with non-missing Key Stage 2 results who remain in the sample
for all years from 2006 to 2011 (excluding 2010) and who are close to
the fringe boundary.
We derive various school level characteristics: number of pupils;
proportion of pupil eligible for free school meals (FSM); proportion of
pupil with English as an additional language (EAL); proportion of pupils
with a statement of special educational needs (SEN), with and without
statements; and, proportion of pupils from non-white ethnic back-
grounds. Eligibility for free school meals is a rather coarse measure of
deprivation, so we also use other measures of deprivation based on the
area in which pupils live: average percentile rank on the Index of
Multiple Deprivation and average percentile rank on the Income
Deprivation Affecting Children Index (IDACI).
We use funding and expenditure levels defined in Section 251 out-
turn data, which reports funding and expenditure levels for each fi-
nancial year (April to March) for all maintained schools in England.
Information on staffing levels is taken from the Local Education
Authority School Information Service (LEASIS) and its later replace-
ments. We also make use of Consistent Financial Reporting data (CFR),
which shows spending per pupil on different types of inputs, grouped as
follows: teachers; teaching assistants; all other staff; services (e.g. ca-
tering and energy); and, equipment (e.g. books, maintenance and other
learning resources).
As Key Stage 2 tests are taken in the summer of each year, we link
these results to school characteristics defined in January of the same
year (taken from the Spring Census), staffing levels defined for the same
academic year (LEASIS) and to funding/expenditure levels in the fi-
nancial year most recently ended (e.g. we link May 2011 test results to
funding and expenditure per pupil for the 2010–11 financial year,
which ended in March 2011).
For teacher pay levels, we make use of the School Workforce Census
that contains the pay, experience, turnover, absence and broad char-
acteristics for all employees in schools across England from 2010 on-
wards.7
Our final sample consists of 238 primary schools (111 on the high-
pay side of the boundary and 127 on the lower-pay side) which have a
common sample of all outcomes.8
4.3. Descriptive statistics
As discussed in Section 4.1, small or insignificant differences in
observable characteristics across the boundary would make our iden-
tification assumptions more plausible. Table 1 (panel A) shows the
average characteristics of schools within 2 km of the fringe London pay
boundary and compares the characteristics of all schools just inside and
outside each boundary.9
Fig. 2. Level ofteacher salary scales across fringe and rest of England (2004/05 and 2010/11), Source: School Teachers Pay and Conditions Document.
6 Externally assessed Science tests were stopped from 2009 onwards.
7 We make use of the School Workforce Census in 2011 only, given un-
certainty regarding the quality of data in 2010.
8 This selection omits 18 primary schools - 9 on the high-pay side and 9 on the
low-pay side - that have attainment results but not at least one other outcome.
9 The choice of distance does not change this finding. See Tables A.1 and A.2
for 1 km and 3 km, respectively. Figures are pooled across all years. Changes
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At the fringe area boundary, it is clear that schools are largely ba-
lanced in observable characteristics. Although a likelihood ratio test
suggests that we should reject the null hypothesis that the differences
are jointly zero, the actual differences are very small in absolute value.
The low value of the pseudo R-squared (0.054) also suggests that these
covariates explain very little of the variation in terms of whether
schools are in high or low pay areas. Furthermore, there are no clear
differences for individual years or differential trends across time (Fig.
A.3).
Panel B shows that there are no significant differences in raw
funding levels at the fringe boundary, which suggests schools must pay
these higher teacher salaries within fixed budgets. Therefore, there is a
relatively good balance in observable characteristics along the fringe
boundary and no differences in school budgets.
To give a brief preview of our main findings on student achieve-
ment, Panel C shows the small raw differences in average student
achievement at schools either side of the boundary, measured by the
average score of pupils in age 11 tests in Maths and English (standar-
dised at the national level each year).
5. Empirical analysis
This section presents our main empirical results for the differences
in resources, teacher characteristics and student achievement at the
fringe London pay boundary.
5.1. Resources
Table 2 shows the differences in measures of total funding and ex-
penditure per pupil between schools either side of the fringe pay
boundary (and controlling for observable characteristics using FILM).
This is shown for schools within 1, 2 and 3 km of the boundary. The first
row shows there are small and generally statistically insignificant dif-
ferences in total grant funding per pupil (always less than £56 per
pupil). The second row then examines differences in total income per
pupil, which incorporates any self-generated income (either through
parent donations or renting out facilities). Such income is minimal for
most schools, and differences in total income per pupil are again small
and generally statistically insignificant. In principle, income need not
exactly equate to expenditure each year as schools can run small sur-
pluses and deficits. The third row, however, confirms that there are no
large differences in total expenditure per pupil. The difference in total
expenditure for schools within 3 km is statistically significant at the
10% level. However, this is small and actually suggests that schools on
the high-pay side of the boundary spend less in total (£75 per pupil).
Therefore, these results provide no evidence to suggest that schools on
the high pay side of the boundary experience any increase in funding to
compensate them for having to pay teachers according to higher salary
scales.
Table 3 shows how schools on the high-pay side the boundary adjust
resources in light of the higher salary scales and no difference in
funding. We start by examining teacher remuneration (panel A). Note
that data is only available for 2011 here. The first row shows the dif-
ference in base salary levels across the boundary (i.e. before any ad-
ditional payments). For our preferred specification, the estimated dif-
ference in base salary levels (£550) is slightly below the difference in
salary scales (around £1,000 for 2011). When we include all payments
(including additional payments above base salary) in row 2, these dif-
ferences more closely match the difference in salary scales (with esti-
mates ranging from £645 to £1,130). In row 3, we examine whether
there are any differences in the average salary scale point of teacher (a
good proxy for teacher experience given the largely mechanical re-
lationship between teacher salary scale and experience in operation
Table 1
Balance of pupil characteristics and summary statistics across Fringe London
Boundary (2 km).
Within 2 km
Inside Outside Difference
A) Pupil Characteristics
Prop. FSM 0.076 (0.072) 0.077 (0.084) −0.001
Prop. SEN (no statement) 0.206 (0.101) 0.207 (0.115) −0.001
Prop. SEN (statement) 0.020 (0.023) 0.016 (0.018) 0.004***
Prop. EAL 0.070 (0.106) 0.067 (0.101) 0.003
Prop. non-white 0.162 (0.121) 0.160 (0.133) 0.002
Number of Pupils 259.82
(119.8)
250.17
(110.2)
9.647
IMD Rank 0.731 (0.172) 0.704 (0.174) 0.026**
IDACI Rank 0.656 (0.173) 0.649 (0.184) 0.007
Pseudo R-Squared 0.054
Likelihood Ratio Test (p-value) <0.01
B) Funding and Expenditure
Total grant funding per pupil
(log)
8.201 (0.179) 8.196 (0.190) 0.005
Total expenditure per pupil (log) 8.195 (0.179) 8.192 (0.195) 0.003
C) KS2 Outcomes
English fine points score (std) 0.123 (0.356) 0.104 (0.357) 0.019
Maths fine points score (std) 0.084 (0.348) 0.098 (0.335) -0.013
Number of observations 600 677
Number of Schools 120 136
Notes: *** denotes where difference between schools on inside and outside of
boundary are significant at the 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level. Standard
deviations are in parentheses. The unit of analysis is the school. The sample
includes all primary schools that are present in the National Pupil Database in
all of the academic years 2005/2006, 2006/2007, 2007/2008,2008/2009,
2010/2011 and where the school is within 2km of the fringe London pay
boundary. The likelihood ratio tests the null hypothesis that the differences in
school characteristics are jointly zero. The Pseudo R-squared is taken from a
probit regression of an indicator of whether schools are in the high-pay area on
the set of school characteristics reported in panel A.
Table 2
Difference in funding and expenditure across Fringe/Rest of England Boundary
2006 to 2011: various distances to pay boundary.
(1) (2) (3)
Outcome Within 1 km Within 2 km Within 3 km
Grant funding per pupil (£) −5.55 −22.63 −55.54
[41.56] [31.53] [26.61]*
Total income per pupil (£) −23.40 −36.90 −58.16
[47.44] [33.60] [28.39]*
Total expenditure per pupil (£) −67.56 −69.10 −74.97
[48.03] [36.65] [29.53]*
School and Year Controls Yes
Observations (schools) 542 (111) 1152 (236) 1651 (341)
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level. Standard
errors clustered at the local authority level. All columns report Fully Interacted
Linear Matching estimates. The unit of analysis is the school. The sample in-
cludes all primary schools that are present in the National Pupil Database in all
of the academic years 2005/2006, 2006/2007, 2007/2008,2008/2009, 2010/
2011 and where each dependent variable is observed, within 1 km, 2 km or
3 km of the fringe London pay boundary. The coefficient reported represents
the increase in income or expenditure per pupil associated with the high-pay
side of the boundary. School controls include distance to the boundary, char-
acteristics of the school: percentage of pupils eligible for free school meals, with
English as an additional language, that are non-white, and have a special
educational needs, the number of pupils in the school, dummy variables for
region (North-East London, South-East London, South-West London), rank of
index of multiple deprivation and rank of income deprivation affecting children
index.
(footnote continued)
over time in these characteristics for schools within 2 km of the boundary are
presented in an online appendix (Fig. A.3)
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over this period). There is no evidence of any difference in average
salary scale point across the boundary. This suggests more experienced
teachers do not sort into schools on the high pay side of the boundary,
either through the supply or demand side.
Panel B investigates whether schools adjust staffing levels at the pay
zone boundary. This shows that there are small and statistically insig-
nificant differences in pupil:teacher ratios for schools within 1 km and
2 km of the pay boundary, but a significantly higher pupil:teacher ratio
for schools within 3 km of the pay boundary. This provides some evi-
dence that schools choose to employ relatively fewer teachers on the
high pay side of the boundary, but the estimates are not stable across
distance cut-offs.
The lack of consistent evidence for a reduction in teacher numbers
suggests that either the substitution or income effects are weak, or that
schools are unable to reduce teacher numbers due to regulation (e.g.
maximum class sizes for under 7 s). Given that expenditure on teachers
is relatively lumpy, it might also be hard for schools to reduce teacher
expenditure by a small amount.
In the next row, we look at numbers of teaching assistants per pupil.
Teaching assistants are generally low-skilled staff who assist teaching
during lessons or with administrative tasks (Sibieta (2015)). Although
not statistically significant, the point estimates for schools within 1 km
and 2 km of the pay boundary are consistent with schools choosing
higher ratios of pupils to assistants on the high-pay side of the
boundary, suggesting that schools might be responding by cutting as-
sistant numbers. However, as for the pupil:teacher ratio, schools within
3 km of the boundary exhibit a different pattern.
Panel C then examines spending per pupil on teachers, teaching
assistants, other staff, services and equipment. Here, there is suggestive
evidence of slightly higher spending per pupil on teachers (reflecting
higher salaries and little change in quantity) and typically a small re-
duction in spending on teaching assistants and other staff, per pupil.
Spending on services per pupil is also lower on the high-pay side of the
boundary (although not significantly so) which is noteworthy as this
category of expenditure includes items that are typically difficult to
shift (for example energy and catering expenditure). There are sig-
nificant reductions in spending on equipment (learning resources, in-
formation communication technology and spending on the school
premises) per pupil on the high-pay side of the boundary, around £30
for schools within 2 km of the boundary. These differences equate to
reductions in other expenditure per pupil of about 3% and 6%, re-
spectively.
Therefore, there is no evidence of any additional funding or total
expenditure for schools on the high-pay side of the fringe boundary.
Despite this, there is also no evidence of pay smoothing, with differ-
ences in actual teacher pay roughly in line with the salary scales. There
is also no evidence of any differences in the composition of teachers in
terms of their salary scale point (a good proxy for experience) or any
changes in teacher numbers. Instead, there are small reductions in
numbers of assistants per pupil and much larger reductions in other
expenditure (particularly equipment) per pupil. Schools thus seem to
respond to the higher salary scales and fixed budgets by paying the
higher salaries and cutting non-instructional expenditure in order to do
so.10
Table 3
Difference in input choices across Fringe/Rest of England Boundary 2006 to
2011: various distances to pay boundary.
(1) (2) (3)
Outcome Within 1 km Within 2 km Within 3 km
(A) Teacher Remuneration (2011
only)
Teacher Salary (£) 632.55 550.82 537.22
[991.63] [601.9] [461.68]
Teacher Total Pay (£) 1129.67 687.19 645.42
[1540.39] [781.32] [582.89]
Average salary Scale Point (1–9) −0.11 0.10 0.03
[0.24] [0.28] [0.21]
(B) Staff Ratios (years pooled)
Pupil:Teacher Ratio 0.11 −0.02 0.38
[0.33] [0.24] [0.19]*
Pupil: Assistant Ratio 22.56 14.20 −12.79
[16.63] [12.23] [13.23]
(C) Spending on different inputs (per pupil) (£)
Teachers 29.00 34.33 11.58
[32.02] [22.94] [18.57]
Teaching Assistants 14.20 −25.82 −21.79
[20.33] [18.40] [13.39]
Other staff 3.36 −20.78 −16.63
[15.32] [10.80] [8.80]
Services −43.96 −10.83 −14.48
[16.72]** [11.74] [10.59]
Equipment −49.55 −29.64 −27.25
[16.16]** [10.34]** [9.23]**
School and Year Controls Yes
Observations (schools) 542 (111) 1152 (236) 1651 (341)
2011 Schools 100 232 329
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level. Standard
errors clustered at the local authority level. All columns report Fully Interacted
Linear Matching estimates. The unit of analysis is the school. The sample in-
cludes all primary schools that are present in the National Pupil Database in all
of the academic years 2005/2006, 2006/2007, 2007/2008,2008/2009, 2010/
2011 and where each dependent variable is observed, within 1 km, 2 km or
3 km of the fringe London pay boundary. The coefficient reported represents
the change in the resource margin associated with the high-pay side of the
boundary. School controls include distance to the boundary, characteristics of
the school: percentage of pupils eligible for free school meals, with English as
an additional language, that are non-white, and have a special educational
needs, the number of pupils in the school, dummy variables for region (North-
East London, South-East London, South-West London), rank of index of multiple
deprivation and rank of income deprivation affecting children index.
Table 4
Difference in teacher responses (2011): various distances to pay boundary.
(1) (2) (3)
Outcome Within 1 km Within 2 km Within 3 km
A) Teacher absence (2011 only)
Mean absence −1.42 −0.81 −0.72
[0.90] [0.64] [0.49]
Prop. teachers absent −5.50 −5.95 −5.56
[4.80] [2.88]* [2.31]*
B) Teacher turnover (2011 only)
Prop. teachers < 1 year 0.026 −0.006 −0.006
[0.029] [0.019] [0.016]
Prop. teachers < 2 years −0.007 −0.016 −0.007
[0.041] [0.028] [0.022]
2011 Schools 100 232 329
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level. Standard
errors clustered at the local authority level. All columns report Fully Interacted
Linear Matching estimates. The unit of analysis is the school. The sample in-
cludes all primary schools that are present in the National Pupil Database in all
of the academic years 2005/2006, 2006/2007, 2007/2008,2008/2009, 2010/
2011 and where each dependent variable is observed, within 1 km, 2 km or
3 km of the fringe London pay boundary. The coefficient reported represents
the change in the resource margin associated with the high-pay side of the
boundary. School controls include distance to the boundary, characteristics of
the school: percentage of pupils eligible for free school meals, with English as
an additional language, that are non-white, and have a special educational
needs, the number of pupils in the school, dummy variables for region (North-
East London, South-East London, South-West London), rank of index of multiple
deprivation and rank of income deprivation affecting children index.
10 This contrasts with Cruz (2018) who finds that school districts in Brazil
only increase teacher salaries when they receive extra funding. However, the
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5.2. Mechanisms
Table 4 presents evidence for positive mechanisms which might
offset the negative impact of lower non-teacher spending in schools on
the high-pay side of the boundary. Unfortunately it is not possible to
directly study teacher quality on either side of the boundary as ad-
ministrative data in England has no link between teachers and pupils.11
To provide some evidence of teachers’ responses to the variation in pay
levels, however, Table 4 shows two measures of teacher absence and
two measures of teacher turnover. The proportion of teachers that are
absent at the time of administrative data collection is around 6 per-
centage points, or 12%, lower on the high pay side of the boundary. The
average level of absence is also lower in schools on the high-pay side of
the boundary, although not significantly so. This may suggest that
teachers on the high-pay side of the boundary respond to efficiency
wages, or that teacher well-being is higher. The variation in teacher
absence does not appear to translate into lower teacher turnover,
however, with the proportion of new entrants to the school not sig-
nificantly different across the boundary.
5.3. Student achievement
Table 5 shows the estimates for the differences in average pupil
attainment in Maths and English. These are measured in terms of na-
tional standard deviations, so can be interpreted in effect size terms.
This shows little evidence of any positive difference in student
achievement at the fringe pay zone boundary. For English, the point
estimate is 0.015 standard deviations for our preferred specification of
being within 2 km of the pay zone boundary and an alternative speci-
fication within 3 km of the boundary, and slightly higher (0.033) for
1 km.
The point estimates for Maths are generally very small across all
specifications, with an estimate of −0.007 for our preferred specifica-
tion. The estimates are also relatively precise. The 95% confidence in-
tervals implied by our estimates mean that for our preferred specifi-
cation we are able to rule out quantitatively small effects of 0.056 and
0.036 standard deviations in English and Maths, respectively.
Combined with our previous results, we find no empirical evidence
that the offer of higher teacher salaries combined with reductions in
other expenditure have any positive implications for student achieve-
ment. This suggests that schools optimally adjust other resources in
response to the pay rules and lack of funding.
This could be because a positive effect of higher teacher salaries
(perhaps through lower teacher absences or efficiency wage mechan-
isms more generally) is exactly canceled out by a negative effect of
reductions in other resources. Recent evidence suggests that school
resources have a significant impact on pupil attainment
(Jackson (2018)). We therefore hypothesise that schools efficiently
balance the negative impact of reductions in other spending with the
positive impact on teachers from marginally higher salaries.
As we have argued, however, it is the total effect that is the most
relevant policy parameter for a school considering whether or not to
offer higher salaries from within a fixed budget.
5.4. Robustness checks
Tables A.3 and A.4 show our estimates of the effect of the pay dif-
ferential at the fringe boundary for different measures of distance to the
boundary, in raw and conditional terms (using a range of ways to
control for observable characteristics) and across all years for Maths
and English, respectively. This shows that the differences in student
achievement are largely stable over time, and are qualitatively un-
changed by how and whether we control for observable characteristics.
Figs. A.4 and A.5 estimate the raw difference in student achieve-
ment over a much longer time horizon for schools within 2 km of the
boundary (1995 to 2011). Importantly, the pay zone boundary existed
for all years covered by this data. As this makes use of older school-level
data, we have to use a different measure of student achievement (the
proportion of pupils achieving the expected level in English and Maths).
Although the estimates are clearly more imprecise, the point estimates
remain close to zero throughout the period. This suggests the long-term
equilibrium we observe in the later 2000s has persisted since at least
the early 1990s.
Figs. A.6 and A.7 replicate local linear regression methods re-
commended by Lee and Lemieux (2010) for regression discontinuity
designs. This illustrates how outcomes vary with distance to the
boundary. In particular, we show the local averages for schools in bins
of size 200 m either side of the fringe boundary (black dots) up to 3 km
from the boundary, as well as estimates of the relationship between
distance to the boundary and each outcome based on a linear specifi-
cation (dashed line) and a 7th order polynomial (solid line), each with a
break at the discontinuity. We show this for English (Fig. A.6) and
Maths (Fig. A.7), with data pooled across years. In both cases, there is
no clear or consistent relationship between test scores and distance
from the pay boundary (at least within 3 km either side of the pay
boundaries). The relationship between distance to the boundary and
attainment is best described by a flat line with noise, with the high
order polynomial oscillating around the linear estimates. Indeed, in a
linear regression we are unable to reject the null hypothesis that the
slope coefficients on distance are zero either side of the boundary.
There is also little evidence to suggest a positive jump at the pay
boundary. This flexible approach confirms our main finding that there
is no difference in student achievement at the pay zone boundary.
Table 5
Difference in student achievement across Fringe/Rest of England Boundary
2006 to 2011: various distances to pay boundary.
(1) (2) (3)
Outcome Within 1 km Within 2 km Within 3 km
KS2 Fine Points Score (std)
English 0.033 0.015 0.015
[0.031] [0.021] [0.018]
Maths 0.018 −0.007 −0.006
[0.028] [0.022] [0.020]
School and Year Controls Yes
Observations (schools) 542 (111) 1152 (236) 1651 (341)
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level. Standard
errors clustered at the local authority level. All columns report Fully Interacted
Linear Matching estimates. The unit of analysis is the school. The sample in-
cludes all primary schools that are present in the National Pupil Database in all
of the academic years 2005/2006, 2006/2007, 2007/2008,2008/2009, 2010/
2011 and where each dependent variable is observed, within 1 km, 2 km or
3 km of the fringe London pay boundary. The coefficient reported represents
the change in the KS2 fine point score in each subject (standardised at the
national level) associated with the high-pay side of the boundary. School con-
trols include distance to the boundary, characteristics of the school: percentage
of pupils eligible for free school meals, with English as an additional language,
that are non-white, and have a special educational needs, the number of pupils
in the school, dummy variables for region (North-East London, South-East
London, South-West London), rank of index of multiple deprivation and rank of
income deprivation affecting children index.
(footnote continued)
context of these findings is somewhat different. Cruz (2018) considers the effect
of a threshold for minimum spend on teachers combined with a funding reform.
We consider the effects of higher minimum salaries for teachers.
11 The administrative data contains some information on the highest level of
qualification of teachers, but this information is incomplete, and a relatively
poor proxy for teaching quality.
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6. Conclusion
In response to increasing school autonomy and funding constraints,
this paper provides the first evidence of the impact of increasing teacher
salaries (and decreasing other spending) on pupil attainment. We use a
natural experiment that forces some schools within a small local area to
offer higher salaries with no compensating change in school budgets.
Teacher pay follows the regulation, despite opportunities for schools to
undo the difference in salary scales, suggesting that schools have some
monopsonistic wage-setting powers. Schools do not, however, cut back
on teacher numbers. Instead, schools use their budgetary autonomy to
make large reductions in non-instructional spending to provide the
higher teacher salaries, which reveals information about schools’ re-
source preferences.
We find no evidence of teacher sorting effects, measured by the
average level of experience or higher teacher turnover. However, we do
find evidence of potential efficiency wage effects through reduced
teacher absence, equivalent to around a 12% reduction.
The total combined effect on student achievement of higher teacher
salaries, reduced teacher absence and reduced non-instructional
spending is estimated to be very close to zero. Schools seem to adjust
resources optimally in response to the pay regulation and no extra
funding, effectively moving around the Pareto frontier. Given recent
evidence showing a positive effect of school resources on student
achievement and human capital (Jackson et al. (2015); Jackson (2018))
and negative effects of teacher absence Herrmann and Rockoff (2012),
we interpret our results as representing offsetting negative resource and
positive effects from reductions in teacher absence.
This suggests that offering small increases in teacher salaries from
within a fixed budget are unlikely to be a good use of new freedoms on
teacher pay for schools in England or the US. This finding is relevant
both to autonomous and regulated schools in England, particularly
given that all schools have similar freedoms on non-instructional
spending and have had flexibility in teacher pay awards since 2013. The
results are generalisable to educational systems with similar flexibilities
and comparable levels of teacher pay relative to outside wages.
Comparing our results with previous work on teacher pay (Loeb and
Page (2000); Gilpin (2012); Leigh (2012); Hendricks (2014);
Britton and Propper (2016)) suggests that teacher quality is more sen-
sitive to pay levels when individuals make their occupational choices,
rather than when they decide where to teach. In future work, it will be
important to understand the reasons driving why the sorting of teachers
across schools might not be sensitive to pay levels. This could be be-
cause teacher decisions are more sensitive to pupil characteristics or
non-pecuniary rewards (Hanushek et al. (2004);
Bonesronning et al. (2005)) or because potential teacher quality is not
observable among a pool of applicants (Delfgaauw and Dur (2007); Bó,
Finan, and Rossi (2013)). Investigating this explanation would require a
more detailed understanding about how schools make hiring decisions
by collecting data on the characteristics of the pool of applicants for
individual teacher positions.
Furthermore, although we observe no difference in student
achievement at the pay boundary, it might be that changes in non-in-
structional spending have implications for other non-achievement
outcomes, for example pupil behaviour or health, which would require
further data collection and research.
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Appendix A
Table A.1
Balance of pupil characteristics and summary statistics across Fringe Boundary (1 km).
Within 1 km
Inside Outside Difference
(A) Pupil Characteristics
Prop. FSM 0.07 (0.07) 0.08 (0.08) −0.01
Prop. SEN (no statement) 0.21 (0.10) 0.21 (0.12) 0
Prop. SEN (statement) 0.02 (0.02) 0.01 (0.02) 0.01***
Prop. EAL 0.06 (0.09) 0.06 (0.10) 0
Prop. non-white 0.15 (0.11) 0.15 (0.13) 0
Number of Pupils 246.3 (124.5) 231.6 (100.4) 14.77
IMD Rank 0.75 (0.15) 0.72 (0.17) 0.03*
IDACI Rank 0.68 (0.16) 0.66 (0.18) 0.02
Pseudo R-Squared 0.08
Likelihood Ratio Test (p-value) <0.01
(B) Funding and Expenditure
Total grant funding per pupil (log) 8.218 (0.177) 8.204 (0.194) 0.014
Total expenditure per pupil (log) 8.209 (0.176) 8.198 (0.194) 0.012
(C) KS2 Outcomes
English fine points score (std) 0.139 (0.332) 0.097 (0.374) 0.042
Maths fine points score (std) 0.108 (0.319) 0.098 (0.331) 0.011
Number of observations 280 319
Number of Schools 56 64
Notes: *** denotes where difference between schools on inside and outside of boundary are significant at the 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level.
Standard deviations are in parentheses. The unit of analysis is the school. The sample includes all primary schools that are present in the National
Pupil Database in all of the academic years 2005/2006, 2006/2007, 2007/2008,2008/2009, 2010/2011 and where the school is within 1 km of the
fringe London pay boundary. The likelihood ratio tests the null hypothesis that the differences in school characteristics are jointly zero. The Pseudo R-
squared is taken from a probit regression of an indicator of whether schools are in the high-pay area on the set of school characteristics reported in
panel A.
Table A.2
Balance of pupil characteristics and summary statistics across Fringe Boundary (3 km).
Within 3 km
Inside Outside Difference
(A) Pupil Characteristics
Prop. FSM 0.083 (0.084) 0.087 (0.095) −0.003
Prop. SEN (no statement) 0.209 (0.106) 0.208 (0.114) 0.001
Prop. SEN (statement) 0.020 (0.022) 0.017 (0.020) 0.003**
Prop. EAL 0.067 (0.097) 0.072 (0.106) −0.005
Prop. non-white 0.169 (0.134) 0.167 (0.146) 0.002
Number of Pupils 266.73
(125.6)
246.19
(108.7)
20.534***
IMD Rank 0.717 (0.185) 0.692 (0.186) 0.025**
IDACI Rank 0.639 (0.186) 0.637 (0.193) 0.002
Pseudo R-Squared 0.051
Likelihood Ratio Test (p-value) <0.01
(B) Funding and Expenditure
Total grant funding per pupil
(log)
8.204 (0.180) 8.214 (0.189) -0.01
Total expenditure per pupil (log) 8.198 (0.180) 8.207 (0.191) -0.01
(C) KS2 Outcomes
English fine points score (std) 0.105 (0.434) 0.102 (0.361) 0.003
Maths fine points score (std) 0.070 (0.449) 0.093 (0.349) -0.023
Number of observations 865 966
Number of Schools 173 195
Notes: *** denotes where difference between schools on inside and outside of boundary are significant at the 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level.
Standard deviations are in parentheses. The unit of analysis is the school. The sample includes all primary schools that are present in the National
Pupil Database in all of the academic years 2005/2006, 2006/2007, 2007/2008,2008/2009, 2010/2011 and where the school is within 3 km of the
fringe London pay boundary. The likelihood ratio tests the null hypothesis that the differences in school characteristics are jointly zero. The Pseudo R-
squared is taken from a probit regression of an indicator of whether schools are in the high-pay area on the set of school characteristics reported in
panel A.
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Table A.3
Estimated difference in student achievement in English across the Fringe London, various years, distances and methods for controlling for observables.
Kernel
Raw gap OLS FILM Matching
Within 1 km
2006 0.038 0.040 0.038 0.052
[0.077] [0.048] [0.032] [0.078]
2007 0.133 0.134 0.124 0.054
[0.101] [0.088] [ 0.053]* [0.100]
2008 0.009 −0.038 −0.045 −0.089
[0.079] [0.040] [0.037] [0.077]
2009 0.075 0.036 0.038 0.011
[0.113] [0.051] [0.040] [0.076]
2011 −0.019 0.000 −0.034 −0.041
[0.118] [0.065] [0.031] [−0.070]
Within 2 km
2006 0.027 0.027 0.036 0.007
[0.077] [0.023] [0.021] [0.052]
2007 0.037 0.033 0.029 0.034
[0.067] [0.028] [0.016] [0.058]
2008 0.033 0.005 0.003 0.005
[0.086] [0.025] [0.025] [0.051]
2009 0.051 0.020 0.007 −0.003
[0.083] [0.032] [0.016] [0.050]
2011 0.022 −0.001 −0.011 −0.036
[0.099] [0.039] [0.029] [0.050]
Within 3 km
2006 0.039 0.037 0.045 0.022
[0.076] [0.026] [0.015]* [0.043]
2007 0.017 0.017 0.013 0.012
[0.077] [0.023] [0.018] [0.048]
2008 0.030 0.013 0.009 0.007
[0.098] [0.026] [0.011] [0.041]
2009 0.010 0.023 −0.008 −0.008
[0.100] [0.025] [0.017] [0.039]
2011 −0.002 0.012 −0.002 −0.018
[0.109] [0.031] [0.026] [0.042]
School and Year Controls Yes
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level. Standard errors in brackets clustered at the local authority level. FILM refers to Fully Interacted
Linear Matching. The unit of analysis is the school. The sample includes all primary schools that are present in the National Pupil Database in all of the academic
years 2005/2006, 2006/2007, 2007/2008,2008/2009, 2010/2011 and where each dependent variable is observed, within 2 km of the fringe London pay boundary.
The coefficient reported represents the difference in KS2 fine point score in English (standardised at the national level) associated with the high-pay side of the
boundary.
Table A.4
Estimated difference in student achievement in Maths across the Fringe London boundary, various years, distances and methods for controlling for observables.
Kernel
Raw gap OLS FILM Matching
Within 1 km of the Fringe
Boundary
2006 0.002 −0.002 −0.003 −0.003
[0.075] [0.053] [0.045] [0.075]
2007 0.066 0.076 0.073 0.038
[0.101] [0.074] [0.048] [0.087]
2008 −0.017 −0.035 −0.033 −0.083
[0.082] [0.036] [0.040] [0.073]
2009 0.053 0.018 0.002 −0.013
[0.100] [0.026] [0.034] [0.064]
2011 −0.017 0.012 −0.014 −0.009
[0.094] [0.053] [0.029] [0.064]
Within 2 km of the Fringe
Boundary
2006 −0.021 −0.030 −0.016 −0.045
[0.065] [0.029] [0.023] [0.051]
2007 0.012 0.000 −0.001 −0.003
[0.079] [0.031] [0.017] [0.055]
2008 0.031 0.032 0.027 0.032
[0.071] [0.015] [0.018] [0.047]
2009 −0.007 −0.040 −0.046 −0.050
[0.076] [0.031] [0.019]* [0.047]
2011 0.021 −0.001 −0.014 −0.031
[0.088] [0.036] [0.032] [0.046]
Within 3 km of the Fringe
Boundary
(continued on next page)
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Fig. A.1. All teacher pay regions, Source: School Teachers Pay and Conditions Document.
Table A.4 (continued)
Kernel
Raw gap OLS FILM Matching
2006 0.011 0.007 0.014 −0.012
[0.074] [0.018] [0.018] [0.042]
2007 0.013 0.020 0.017 0.006
[0.079] [0.020] [0.014] [0.046]
2008 0.004 0.009 −0.007 −0.002
[0.098] [0.028] [0.024] [0.049]
2009 −0.033 −0.031 −0.045 −0.045
[0.092] [0.021] [0.012]** [0.038]
2011 −0.017 0.000 −0.016 −0.028
[0.104] [0.034] [0.021] [0.040]
School and Year Controls Yes
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level. Standard errors in brackets clustered at the local authority level. FILM refers to Fully Interacted Linear
Matching. The unit of analysis is the school. The sample includes all primary schools that are present in the National Pupil Database in all of the academic years 2005/2006,
2006/2007, 2007/2008,2008/2009, 2010/2011 and where each dependent variable is observed, within 2 km of the fringe London pay boundary. The coefficient reported
represents the difference in KS2 fine point score in Maths (standardised at the national level) associated with the high−pay side of the boundary.
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Fig. A.2. Inner and Outer London pay regions, Source: School Teachers Pay and Conditions Document.
Fig. A.3. Changes in covariates over time for schools inside and outer pay boundaries, Notes Sample includes primary schools within 2 km of each boundary.
’Treatment’ refers to schools on the high−pay side of the boundary. Source: National Pupil Database and LEASIS.
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Fig. A.4. Difference in proportion achieving level 4 or above in KS2 English at Fringe boundary for schools within 2 km (with 95% CIs). Notes Solid lines represents
raw difference in proportion of pupils achieving level 4 in English at schools within 2 km and either side of the fringe London pay boundary. Dashed lines show 95%
confidence intervals.
Fig. A.5. Difference in proportion achieving level 4 or above in KS2 Maths at Fringe boundary for schools within 2 km (with 95% CIs), Notes Solid lines represents
raw difference in proportion of pupils achieving level 4 in Maths at schools within 2 km and either side of the fringe London pay boundary. Dashed lines show 95%
confidence intervals.
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Supplementary material
Supplementary material associated with this article can be found, in the online version, at 10.1016/j.econedurev.2019.101924
References
Baker, R. B. (2019). School resources and labor market outcomes: evidence from early twen-
tieth-century georgia. Economics of Education Review, 70, 35–47. https://doi.org/10.1016/
j.econedurev.2019.03.001.
Blundell, R., Dearden, L., & Sianesi, B. (2005). Evaluating the effect of education on earnings:
models, methods and results from the national child development survey. Journal of the
Royal Statistical Society Series A, 168(3), 473–512.
Bó, E. D., Finan, F., & Rossi, M. A. (2013). Strengthening state capabilities: the role of financial
incentives in the call to public service. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 128(3),
1169–1218.
Bonesronning, H., Falch, T., & Strom, B. (2005). Teacher sorting, teacher quality, and student
composition. European Economic Review, 49(2), 457–483.
Britton, J., & Propper, C. (2016). Teacher pay and school productivity: exploiting wage reg-
ulation. Journal of Public Economics, 133, 75–89.
Cabrera, J. M., & Webbink, D. (2019). Do higher salaries yield better teachers and better student
outcomes? Journal of Human Resources. https://doi.org/10.3368/jhr.55.4.0717-8911R3.
Clotfelter, C., Glennie, E., Ladd, H., & Vigdor, J. (2008). Would higher salaries keep teachers in
high-poverty schools? evidence from a policy intervention in north carolina. Journal of
Public Economics, 92(5), 1352–1370. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2007.07.003.
Cruz, T. (2018). Teacher hiring decisions: How do governments react to an exogenous redis-
tribution of education funds? Economics of Education Review, 67, 58–81. https://doi.org/10.
1016/j.econedurev.2018.09.002.
Delfgaauw, J., & Dur, R. (2007). Signaling and screening of workers’ motivation. Journal of
Economic Behavior & Organization, 62(4), 605–624.
Fig. A.6. Relationship between distance to the
Fringe boundary and English test scores. Notes
Dashed line represents linear specification es-
timated either side of boundary, solid line is
based on a 7th order polynomial and dots are
local averages by 200m from the pay zone
boundary. KS2 English test scores are standar-
dised at the national level.
Fig. A.7. Relationship between distance to the
Fringe boundary and Maths test scores, Notes
Dashed line represents linear specification es-
timated either side of boundary, solid line is
based on a 7th order polynomial and dots are
local averages by 200m from the pay zone
boundary. KS2 Maths test scores are standar-
dised at the national level.
E. Greaves and L. Sibieta Economics of Education Review 73 (2019) 101924
16
Gibbons, S., McNally, S., & Viarengo, M. (2018). Does additional spending help urban schools?
An evaluation using boundary discontinuities. Journal of the European Economic Association,
16(5), 1618–1668. https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvx038.
Gilpin, G. A. (2012). Teacher salaries and teacher aptitude: An analysis using quantile regres-
sions. Economics of Education Review, 31(3), 15–29. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econedurev.
2012.01.003.
Hanushek, E. A. (2006). School resources. In E. Hanushek, & F. Welch (Vol. Eds.), Handbook of
the economics of education. 2. Handbook of the economics of education (pp. 865–908).
Elsevier.
Hanushek, E. A., Kain, E. F., & Rivkin, S. G. (2004). Why public schools lose teachers. Journal of
Human Resources, 39(2), 326–354.
Hendricks, M. D. (2014). Does it pay to pay teachers more? Evidence from texas. Journal of
Public Economics, 109(C), 50–63.
Herrmann, M. A., & Rockoff, J. E. (2012). Worker absence and productivity: Evidence from
teaching. Journal of Labor Economics, 30(4), 749–782.
Hyman, J. (2017). Does money matter in the long run? Effects of school spending on educa-
tional attainment. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 9(4), 256–280. https://doi.
org/10.1257/pol.20150249.
Jackson, C. K. (2018). Does school spending matter? The new literature on an old questionWorking
Paper. National Bureau of Economic Researchhttps://doi.org/10.3386/w25368.
Jackson, C. K., Johnson, R. C., & Persico, C. (2015). The effects of school spending on educa-
tional and economic outcomes: Evidence from school finance reforms. The Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 131(1), 157–218. https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjv036.
Jackson, C. K., Wigger, C., & Xiong, H. (2018). Do school spending cuts matter? Evidence from the
great recessionWorking Paper. National Bureau of Economic Researchhttps://doi.org/10.
3386/w24203.
Lafortune, J., Rothstein, J., & Schanzenbach, D. W. (2018). School finance reform and the
distribution of student achievement. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 10(2),
1–26. https://doi.org/10.1257/app.20160567.
Lee, D. S., & Lemieux, T. (2010). Regression discontinuity designs in economics. Journal of
Economic Literature, 48(2), 281–355.
Leigh, A. (2012). Teacher pay and teacher aptitude. Economics of Education Review, 31(3),
41–53. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econedurev.2012.02.001.
Loeb, S., & Page, M. E. (2000). Examining the link between teacher wages and student out-
comes: The importance of alternative labor market opportunities and non-pecuniary var-
iation. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 82(3), 393–408.
Ransom, M. R., & Sims, D. P. (2010). Estimating the Firm’s labor supply curve in a “New
Monopsony” framework: Schoolteachers in Missouri. Journal of Labor Economics, 28(2),
331–355.
de Ree, J., Muralidharan, K., Pradhan, M., & Rogers, H. (2018). Double for nothing?
Experimental evidence on an unconditional teacher salary increase in Indonesia. The
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 133(2), 993–1039. https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjx040.
Roy, A. (1951). Some thoughts on the distribution of earnings. Oxford Economics Papers (New
Series), 3, 135–146.
Shapiro, C., & Stiglitz, J. E. (1984). Equilibrium unemployment as a worker discipline device.
American Economic Review, 74(3), 433–444.
Sibieta, L. (2015). School spending in England 2010 to 2015. Fiscal Studies, 36(3), 283–302.
Steele, J. L., Murnane, R. J., & Willett, J. B. (2010). Do financial incentives help low-performing
schools attract and keep academically talented teachers? Evidence from california. Journal
of Policy Analysis and Management, 29(3), 451–478.
Todd, P. E., & Wolpin, K. I. (2003). On the specification and estimation of the production
function for cognitive achievement. Economic Journal, 113(485), F3–F33.
Tran, H. (2017). Does the pay stance of South Carolina public school districts influence their
math and science achievement scores? Journal of Education Finance, 43(2), 105–122.
Zabalza, T. P. A., & Williams, G. (1979). The economics of teacher supply. Cambridge University
Press.
E. Greaves and L. Sibieta Economics of Education Review 73 (2019) 101924
17
